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Abstract	
In	 2012,	 the	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 became	 the	most	watched	 human	 rights	 video	 to	 date,	
garnering	over	100	million	views	 in	 just	 six	days.	The	Campaign	relied	on	easily	digestible	
narratives	that	encouraged	an	 imperialistic	military‐legal	response	to	the	Lord’s	Resistance	
Army’s	use	of	 child	 soldiers	 in	Uganda.	Drawing	on	Mutua’s	 (2001)	 framework	of	 savages,	
victims	 and	 saviours,	 this	 article	 analyses	 the	 Kony	 2012	 phenomenon	 to	 illustrate	 how	 a	
digital	 campaign	 can	 validate	 and	 reproduce	 subjectivities	 and	 structures	 of	 domination	
rather	 than	stimulate	sustainable	reform‐based	change.	The	article	critically	reflects	on	the	
use	 of	 digital	 technology	 by	 the	 Kony	 2012	 campaign	 and	 considers	 the	 potential	 for	
‘slacktivism’	and	‘clicktivism’.	
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Introduction	
On	5	March	 2012,	 a	 30‐minute	 human	 rights	 video	was	 released	 online.	 The	 video	 called	 for	
international	support	to	capture	Joseph	Kony,	the	leader	of	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	(LRA)	in	
Uganda,	 and	 prosecute	 him	 for	 the	 recruitment	 and	 use	 of	 child	 soldiers.	 The	 video	 (see	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc)	was	 released	by	 Invisible	Children,	 a	non‐
government	organisation	founded	in	2004	with	the	aim	of	highlighting	the	atrocities	committed	
by	 Joseph	 Kony	 and	 the	 LRA.	 The	 video	 sought	 to	 ‘make	 Kony	 famous’	 by	 presenting	 an	
emotionally	engaging	story	that	would	mobilise	individuals	across	the	world.	Invisible	Children	
encouraged	participants	 to	act	by	sharing	 the	Kony	2012	video	 through	their	social	networks	
and	with	their	online	celebrity	 ‘friends’	via	Twitter	and	Facebook.	The	video	quickly	became	a	
worldwide	 phenomenon.	 Within	 only	 six	 days	 of	 its	 release,	 Kony	 2012	 received	 over	 100	
million	views,	making	it	the	most	watched	human	rights	video	to	date	(Visible	Measures	2012).		
	
To	create	a	powerful	message	that	elicited	such	a	strong	response,	the	Kony	2012	video	relied	
upon	 conceptions	 of	 universal	 human	 rights	 and	 humanitarianism	 which	 view	 the	 west	 as	
powerful,	 morally	 superior	 saviours	 for	 the	 developing	 world	 (Kennedy	 2002,	 2004).	 Mutua	
(1996,	2001)	examines	how	Eurocentric	and	western‐dominated	human	rights	discourses	are	
reproduced	 through	existing	 structures	 and	narratives	by	exploring	 the	metaphor	of	 savages,	
victims	 and	 saviours.	 The	 savages,	 victims,	 saviours	 nexus	 is	 a	 three‐dimensional	 metaphor	
underpinning	human	rights	struggles	that	pit	good	against	evil,	and	prompt	intervention	from	
the	morally	superior	West.	The	metaphor	is	highly	racialised	and	gendered	in	its	construction	of	
subjects:	 savages	are	black,	masculine	and	barbaric;	victims	are	vulnerable,	black	women	and	
children;	and	saviours	are	white,	 rational,	Western	men.	The	state	 is	often	constructed	as	 the	
savage	 ‘other’	 for	 failing	 to	 control	 barbaric	 behaviour;	 however,	 as	 Mutua	 (2001:	 220‐221)	
explains,	 the	 real	 savage	 is	 the	 ‘normative	 cultural	 fabric	 or	 variant	 expressed	 by	 that	 state’.	
Following	this	metaphor,	victims	are	the	powerless,	innocent	and	vulnerable	‘engines	that	drive	
the	human	rights	movement’	(Mutua	2001:	227).		
	
Drawing	on	Mutua’s	(2001)	 framework	of	savages,	victims	and	saviours,	 this	article	examines	
the	dominant	narratives	and	subjectivities	 that	were	reproduced	by	the	Kony	2012	campaign.	
Kony	 2012	 depicted	 Joseph	 Kony	 and	 the	 LRA	 as	 the	 savages	 responsible	 for	 atrocities	 in	
Uganda	while	also	showing	Uganda	and	the	broader	African	culture	as	uncivilized	and	barbaric.	
As	 the	 counterpoint	 to	 this	 picture	 of	 savagery,	 the	 video	 constructed	 the	 victims	 as	 child	
soldiers	who	are	vulnerable,	innocent	and	preyed	upon	by	immoral	and	uncontrollable	Ugandan	
warlords.	The	Kony	2012	campaign	identified	three	core	‘saviour’	groups	tasked	with	rescuing	
these	 victims:	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court;	 the	 US	military;	 and	 the	 individual	 ‘activists’	
who	‘liked’	or	‘shared’	the	Kony	2012	video.	The	video’s	call	for	US	military	intervention	and	its	
support	 of	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 prosecutions	 validated	 the	 increasing	 and	 highly	
selective	use	of	military	and	judicial	interventions	in	situations	defined	as	international	crimes.	
Additionally,	 the	 video’s	 appeal	 for	 individuals	 to	 unite	 in	 the	 battle	 against	 Joseph	 Kony	
constructed	 individuals	as	globally‐oriented	 ‘saviours’.	These	savior	subjects	were	 legitimated	
by	the	rhetoric	of	morally	superior	citizens	of	the	global	north.	This	article	seeks	to	render	the	
reproduction	 of	 cultural	 narratives	 as	 employed	 by	 Kony	 2012	 more	 visible,	 explore	 the	
reinforcement	 of	 emerging	 narratives	 of	 international	 and	 criminal	 justice	 and	 military	
interventions,	and	examine	the	consequences	of	constructing	‘saviours’	in	a	digital	environment	
that	supports	low‐threshold	activism	(Van	Laer	and	Van	Aelst	2010).		
	
Invisible	children,	digital	space	and	the	Kony	2012	connective	network		
Invisible	Children	 is	an	organisation	founded	in	2004	by	Bobby	Bailey,	Lauren	Poole	and	Jason	
Russell,	 three	 filmmakers	 who	 travelled	 to	 Uganda	 in	 2003	 in	 ‘search	 of	 a	 story’	 (Invisible	
Children	2012a).	As	the	Invisible	Children	website	explains,	the	trio	‘discovered	a	war	in	Uganda	
that	had	been	going	on	for	20	years’	and	met	Jacob,	a	former	child	solider	who	had	escaped	the	
LRA.	The	 filmmakers	promised	 Jacob	 that	 ‘they	would	do	everything	 they	could	 to	 stop	Kony	
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and	end	the	war’	(Invisible	Children	2012a).	The	raison	d’etre	of	Invisible	Children	thus	became	
to	 ‘spread	the	word	about	 the	war	nobody	knew	about’	 (Invisible	Children	2012a)	and	to	use	
‘film,	creativity	and	social	action	to	end	the	use	of	child	soldiers	in	Joseph	Kony’s	rebel	war	and	
restore	LRA‐affected	communities	in	Central	Africa	to	peace	and	prosperity’	(Invisible	Children	
2012a).	 Invisible	Children’s	aim	was	 to	make	films	about	 Joseph	Kony	and	 the	LRA	in	order	to	
‘introduce	 new	 audiences	 to	 the	 conflict,	 create	 mass	 awareness,	 and	 inspire	 global	 action’	
(Invisible	Children	2012a).	The	Kony	2012	Campaign	was	the	outcome.		
	
The	Kony	2012	video	sought	to	present	the	Ugandan	conflict	in	an	emotionally	engaging	format	
that	globally	publicised	the	atrocities	committed	by	Joseph	Kony	and	the	LRA.	Invisible	Children	
strategically	used	social	media	to	broadcast	their	video	and	increase	awareness	of	their	cause.	
In	just	one	week,	the	Kony	2012	video	received	over	100	million	views	(Visible	Measures	2012);	
far	exceeding	the	group’s	more	modest	aim	of	reaching	50,000	online	views.	This	success	was	
achieved	 through	 Invisible	 Children’s	 engagement	 with	 a	 social	 media	 culture	 of	 ‘likes’	 and	
‘sharing’.2	 The	Kony	2012	video	 also	 involved	 an	 offline	 aspect:	 it	 asked	 individuals	 to	 sign	 a	
pledge,	 order	 the	 $30	 Kony	 2012	 bracelet	 and	 action	 kit,	 and	 donate	money	 to	 the	 Invisible	
Children’s	cause.	The	goal	of	online	awareness‐raising	was	thus	supplemented	by	this	material	
support,	 along	 with	 a	 planned	 ‘Cover	 the	 Night’	 event	 (organised	 for	 20	 April	 2012),	 which	
tasked	individuals	with	plastering	Kony	2012	posters	across	cities	around	the	world.3	
		
Modern	 activists,	 like	 those	 found	 in	 the	Kony	2012	 campaign,	 are	 transnationally	 connected	
and	technologically	equipped.	Information	and	communications	technology	(ICT),	such	as	smart	
phones,	personal	computers	and	email,	provide	the	medium	for	heightened	connectivity	while	
increasing	 the	 ability	 of	 individuals	 and	 groups	 to	 organise	 (Shirky	 2008).	 Developments	 in	
these	 digital	 spaces	 are	 fashioned	 and	 supported	 by	 a	 digital	 culture.	 This	 concept	 –	 the	
combination	of	digitality	and	culture	–	is	neatly	summarised	by	Charlie	Gere	(2008)	in	his	book	
Digital	Culture:	
	
To	speak	of	the	digital	is	to	call	up,	metonymically,	the	whole	panoply	of	virtual	
simulacra,	 instantaneous	 communication,	 ubiquitous	 media	 and	 global	
connectivity	that	constitutes	much	of	our	contemporary	experience.	It	is	to	allude	
to	 the	 vast	 range	 of	 applications	 and	 media	 forms	 that	 digital	 technology	 has	
made	possible,	including	virtual	reality,	digital	special	effects,	digital	film,	digital	
television,	electronic	music,	computer	games,	multimedia,	the	Internet,	the	World	
Wide	Web,	digital	telephony	and	Wireless	Application	Protocol	…	From	this	it	is	
possible	to	propose	the	existence	of	a	distinctive	digital	culture,	in	that	the	term	
digital	can	stand	for	a	particular	way	of	 life	of	a	group	or	groups	of	people	at	a	
certain	 period	 in	 history	…	 Digitality	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	marker	 of	 culture	
because	 it	 encompasses	 both	 the	 artefacts	 and	 the	 systems	 of	 signification	 and	
communication	 that	most	clearly	demarcate	our	contemporary	way	of	 life	 from	
others.	(Gere	2008:	15‐16)	
	
Within	 spaces	 of	 digitality,	 social	 action	 is	 encompassed	 in	 an	 ethic	 of	 transcendence	 and	
fluidity.	It	is	no	longer	a	question	of	whether	or	not	activists	will	engage	with	digital	technology	
but	to	what	extent,	making	the	digitality	of	action	a	key	quality	of	modern	forms	of	awareness	
raising	and	resistance.	
	
The	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 illustrates	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 digital	 technologies	 to	 raise	
awareness	 and	 support	while	 signifying	 a	 connective	 action	 network.	 Bennett	 and	 Segerberg	
(2012)	present	an	approach	to	understanding	modern	forms	of	collective	action	coupled	with	
the	use	of	digital	space.	The	authors	suggest	a	personalised	and	pluralist	network	perspective	of	
connective	 action	 that	 recognises	 ICT	 and	 digital	 media	 platforms	 (Facebook,	 Twitter)	 as	
mobilisers	 that	 associate	 networks	 of	 autonomous	 individuals.	 According	 to	 Bennett	 and	
Segerberg	 (2012:	 752‐753),	 ‘this	 connective	 logic,	 taking	 public	 action	 or	 contributing	 to	 a	
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common	 good,	 becomes	 an	 act	 of	 personal	 expression	 and	 recognition	 or	 self‐validation	
achieved	 by	 sharing	 ideas	 and	 actions	 in	 trusted	 relationships’.	What	was	 once	 considered	 a	
combined	 endeavour	 of	 group‐based	 action	 is	 now	 modified	 to	 include	 personalised	
expressions	 outside	 the	 realm	 of	 collective	 action.	 Individuals	 are	 not	 so	 much	 collectively	
dependent	 in	 their	 efforts	 anymore;	 this	 is	 so	 because	 of	 the	 affordances	 offered	 by	 a	 well‐
equipped	connective	network	that	customises	and	personalises	the	field	of	operations.		
	
The	 term	 personalised	 action	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 involving	 the	 ‘presence	 of	 cues	 and	
opportunities	for	customisation	of	engagement	with	issues	and	actions’	along	with	‘the	relative	
absence	 of	 cues	 [including	 action	 frames]	 that	 signal	 ideological	 and	 definitional	 unanimity’	
(Bennett	 and	 Segerberg	 2011:	 772).	 The	 increase	 in	 personalised	 digital	 technologies,	 along	
with	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 need	 for	 group‐based	 collective	 action,	 enables	 individuals	 to	 ‘define	
issues	in	their	own	terms	and	to	network	with	others	through	social	media,	thus	distributing	the	
organisational	burden	among	participants’	(Bennett	and	Segerberg	2011:	773).		
	
This	is	exemplified	by	Invisible	Children’s	strategy	of	encouraging	‘activists’	to	target	20	‘culture	
makers’	 (including	 Oprah	Winfrey,	 Ryan	 Seacrest,	 Justin	 Bieber	 and	 George	 Clooney)	 and	 12	
‘policy	makers’	(including	Condoleezza	Rice,	George	Bush	and	Bill	Clinton)	via	social	media	and	
urge	them	to	share	and	support	the	Kony	2012	video.	This	strategy	mobilised	participants	not	
only	 to	 ‘like’	 information	 via	 Facebook	 and	 ‘retweet’	messages	 via	 Twitter,	 allowing	 them	 to	
become	part	of	a	trend,	but	also	to	personalise	their	messages	and	engagement	with	the	Kony	
2012	Campaign.	This	digital	trend	facilitated	the	rapid	spread	of	the	Kony	2012	video	across	the	
globe	as	high	profile	personalities	with	large	online	followings	(Facebook	and	Twitter)	jumped	
on	 the	 Kony	 2012	 ‘bandwagon’.	 For	 example,	 Oprah	Winfrey	 (more	 than	 22	million	 Twitter	
followers)	 tweeted:	 ‘Thanks	 tweeps	 for	 sending	 me	 info	 about	 ending	 #LRAviolence.	 I	 am	
aware.	 Have	 supported	 with	 $’s	 and	 voice	 and	 will	 not	 stop’.	 Ryan	 Seacrest	 (more	 than	 12	
million	Twitter	 followers)	similarly	 tweeted:	 ‘Was	going	 to	sleep	 last	night	and	saw	ur	tweets	
about	 #StopKony…watched	 in	 bed,	 was	 blown	 away.	 If	 u	 haven’t	 seen	 yet:	 [gives	 website	
address]’	(Goodman	and	Preston	2012).		
	
As	 this	 illustrates,	 the	 shift	 to	 connective	 action	 is	attributed	 to	outcomes	 in	 the	digital	 space	
(that	 is,	 mobile	 technology,	 Web	 2.0,	 and	 so	 on);	 therefore,	 the	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 is	 not	
considered	 here	 as	 a	 social	 movement	 proper	 but	 as	 a	 self‐organising	 connective	 action	
network.	This	is	based	on	our	observation	that	Kony	2012	did	not	espouse	a	social	movement	
identify	or	vocabulary;	 that	 is,	 it	did	not	exemplify:	a	collective	 identity	based	on	networks	of	
interaction;	shared	solidarity;	action	on	conflictual	issues;	or	action	taken	outside	institutional	
mechanisms	(cf	Diani	1992).	The	opening	lines	of	the	Kony	2012	video	state	that	the	campaign	
is	 an	 ‘experiment’	 to	 see	 how	 society’s	 increasing	 online	 connections	 can	 be	 used	 to	 spread	
ideas	and	garner	support	for	social	change	across	the	world	(Invisible	Children	2012a).	Invisible	
Children’s	experiment	exemplifies	the	increasing	influence	connective	networks	have	in	shaping	
social	action.		
	
Savages,	victims	and	saviours:	Reinforcing	intervention	narratives		
In	achieving	widespread	online	popularity	and	visibility,	the	Kony	2012	video	relied	on	devices	
that	 ensured	 that	 the	 story	 of	 Joseph	Kony	 and	 the	 LRA	had	 emotional	 and	moral	 resonance	
while	providing	motivation	for	individuals	to	support	the	cause.	The	video	sought	to	explain	the	
Ugandan	conflict	 in	a	contained	and	easy	 to	understand	manner.	To	do	 this,	 Invisible	Children	
relied	on	binary	depictions	of	good	and	evil;	as	CEO	Ben	Keesey	explains,	‘[t]here	are	few	times	
where	problems	are	black	and	white.	There’s	lots	of	complicated	stuff	in	the	world,	but	Joseph	
Kony	and	what	he’s	doing	is	black	and	white’	(Straziuso	and	Muhumuza	2012).	This	narrative	
over‐simplifies	 the	 situation	 in	Uganda,4	 and	 produces	 a	 one‐dimensional	 understanding	 of	 a	
complex	situation	(Kennedy	2004).		
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The	narrative	device	of	Jason	Russell,	who	explained	the	Ugandan	situation	and	Joseph	Kony’s	
crimes	to	his	angelic	five‐year‐old	son,	increases	these	over‐simplified	constructions	of	conflict	
and	 violence.	 In	 the	 video	 there	 is	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 broader	 causes	 of	 violence	 in	Uganda,	
including	social	structure,	historical	tensions,	the	complicity	of	the	west,	and	the	involvement	of	
a	 host	 of	 actors	 in	 perpetuating	 the	 violence	 to	 achieve	 a	 range	 of	 political	 ends.	 The	 video	
places	sole	responsibility	for	the	widespread	violence	and	atrocities	in	Uganda	on	Joseph	Kony,	
denying	 the	 wider	 contexts	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 President,	
Yoweri	Museveni,	and	his	Ugandan	army	in	the	violence	(Allen	2006).	The	Ugandan	government	
has	also	been	 implicated	 in	violence	 in	the	neighbouring	nation	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo	(Mullins	and	Rothe	2008b),	yet	none	of	these	complexities	are	evident	in	the	Kony	2012	
video.	We	 argue	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 brevity	 and	 clarity	 facilitated	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Kony	
2012	video	in	an	online	space.		
	
Invisible	Children	 relied	on	simplistic	narratives	 to	achieve	moral	 resonance	and	visibility	 in	a	
connected	 digital	 world.	 These	 narratives	 were	 underpinned	 by	 the	 metaphors	 of	 savages,	
victims	and	saviours	that	order	the	human	rights	project	(Mutua	2001).	As	Kennedy	(2004:	14)	
highlights,	‘[t]he	human	rights	vocabulary	makes	us	think	of	evil	as	a	social	machine,	a	theater	of	
roles,	 in	 which	 people	 are	 victims,	 violators,	 and	 bystanders’.	 Perpetrators	 of	 human	 rights	
violations	are	often	constructed	as	barbaric	‘savages’	through	the	images	of	‘blood‐thirsty	third	
world	 despots	 and	 trigger‐happy	 police	 and	 security	 forces’	 (Mutua	 2001:	 225).	 Savages	 are	
often	 depicted	 as	 belonging	 to	 a	 black,	 dark	 or	 non‐western	 race	 and	 are	 characterised	 as	
barbaric	and	primitive,	as	is	exemplified	by	descriptions	of	the	Rwandan	genocide	and	reports	
on	the	use	of	machetes	in	frenzied	attacks	that	typified	a	barbaric	African	culture	(Mutua	2001).	
	
In	the	Kony	2012	video,	Joseph	Kony	is	identified	as	the	perpetrator	of	violence	in	Uganda	and	is	
portrayed	as	barbaric	and	evil,	with	photos	of	him	flashed	across	the	screen	alongside	images	of	
him	 with	 the	 thousands	 of	 children	 he	 allegedly	 abducted.	 Kony’s	 innate	 evil	 is	 reinforced	
through	 narration:	 ‘he	 has	 an	 army,	 takes	 children	 from	 their	 parents,	 gives	 them	 a	 gun	 and	
makes	them	shoot	other	people.	He	makes	them	do	bad	things’	(Invisible	Children	2012a).	Kony	
is	shown	as	primitive	in	scenes	where	he	is	dressed	in	informal,	mismatched	army	attire,	talking	
and	 laughing	 casually	 with	 his	 rag‐tag	 army	 in	 the	 Ugandan	 jungle.	 These	 images	 are	
immediately	 contrasted	 with	 images	 of	 a	 professional	 American	 army	 who	 are	 carefully	
examining	maps	and	formulating	strategies	to	capture	Joseph	Kony.	This	contrast	is	highlighted	
in	dialogue	that	explains	how	the	Ugandan	army	needs	help	to	hunt	and	catch	Kony:	‘they	need	
technology	 and	 training	 to	 track	 him	 in	 the	 vast	 jungle,	 that’s	 where	 the	 American	 advisors	
come	 in	 ...’	 (Invisible	 Children	 2012a).	 Here,	 Kony	 is	 likened	 to	 a	 wild	 animal	 that	 must	 be	
tracked	and	hunted	down	by	 the	 apex	hunter	 from	 the	west.	This	 juxtaposition	of	 the	 savage	
human	rights	violator	 is	 contrasted	by	 the	 image	of	a	victim	who	 is	powerless	and	 in	need	of	
help	from	outside	intervention	in	order	to	overcome	victimisation.	Victims	are	often	described	
as	hordes	of	‘nameless,	despairing	and	dispirited	masses’	or	as	marginalised,	destitute,	poor	and	
helpless	 (Mutua	2001:	 229).	 The	video	 constructed	 ‘ideal	 victims’	 (Christie	1986)	 through	 its	
depiction	 of	 poor	 and	 desperate	 Ugandan	 children	 sleeping	 in	 abandoned	 buildings	 in	 an	
attempt	to	escape	Joseph	Kony.	Kony	was	cast	as	an	evil	and	savage	African	warlord	who	preyed	
upon	 these	 innocent	 and	 defenceless	 children	 causing	 instability	 and	 violence	 throughout	
Uganda.	Images	of	young	children	holding	weapons	and	young	girls	surrounding	Kony	(alluding	
to	girls	as	wives	of	war)	further	highlighted	the	violation	of	childhood	innocence.		
	
These	 images	 essentialise	 victimhood	 and	 perpetuate	 stereotypes	 based	 on	 gender,	 race	 and	
age.	Drumbl	(2012)	highlights	that	representation	of	child	soldiers	as	young	Africans	abducted	
and	forced	to	wield	weapons,	as	upheld	by	Kony	2012,	is	at	odds	with	the	reality	of	the	use	of	
child	soldiers	around	the	world.	More	often	child	soldiers	are	older,	aged	15	years	and	above,	
voluntarily	 enroll,	 do	 not	 carry	weapons	 and	 are	 not	 directly	 implicated	 in	 atrocity	 (Drumbl	
2012).	Kony	2012’s	depiction	of	 young	girls	 also	emphasises	 the	gendered	understandings	of	
conflict	 that	 are	 perpetuated	 through	 human	 rights	 discourses.	 Such	 discourses	 use	
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stereotypical	 views	 of	 women	 as	 innately	 peaceful	 and	 cast	 them	 solely	 as	 victims	 (Orford	
2002).	 Images	of	young	girls	holding	heavy	weapons	 thus	are	doubly	shocking	as	women	and	
children	become	twice	victimised	because	of	their	gender	and	age	(Mutua	2001).		
	
In	Kony	2012,	 images	 of	 desperate	 victims	 are	 strengthened	 by	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 personal	
narrative	 of	 Jacob	 who	 recounted	 his	 experience	 of	 witnessing	 his	 brother’s	 murder.	 The	
inclusion	of	Jacob’s	story	is	held	as	the	exemplar	of	the	plight	of	the	nameless	masses,	providing	
a	more	vivid	illustration	of	victimhood.	Throughout	the	video	there	is	a	notable	lack	of	Ugandan	
voice	and	experience,	with	the	telling	of	Jacob’s	story	the	only	inclusion	of	a	Ugandan	voice.	This	
reinforces	the	highly	racialised	role	of	Ugandans	as	savages	and	victims	because	Ugandans	are	
afforded	no	power	to	explain	the	complexities	of	the	situation	or	provide	culturally	appropriate	
solutions,	leaving	the	superior	West	to	intervene	with	civilised	examples	of	military	and	judicial	
prowess.	Kony	2012	entrenches	the	international	hierarchy	of	race,	colour	and	gender	because	
military	 intervention	 and	 international	 law,	 the	 latter	 based	 on	 masculinst	 foundations	
(Charlesworth	 1999;	 Orford	 2002),	 are	 presented	 as	 the	 only	 solutions.	 Race	 and	 gender	
stereotypes	are	 thus	 combined,	which	 reflects	 Spivak’s	 (1999:	131)	description	of	 the	human	
rights	project	as	‘white	men	…	saving	brown	women	from	brown	men’.		
	
The	valorisation	of	international	intervention	is	facilitated	through	the	construction	of	the	ideal	
victim	(Christie	1986)	which	mobilises	anger	against	human	rights	violators	and	provides	moral	
clarity	about	evil	and	 innocence.	The	savages	and	victims	metaphor	constructs	 the	need	 for	a	
saviour	who	takes	the	form	of	the	human	rights	actor	and	the	entire	human	rights	enterprise.	
The	metaphor	of	the	saviour	is	premised	upon	the	moral	superiority	of	the	west	and	reflects	the	
two	intertwining	characteristics	of	Eurocentric	universalism,	and	Christianity’s	missionary	zeal	
(Mutua	2001).	Orford	(1999:	695)	similarly	explores	the	saviour	identity	illustrating	the	‘hero’	
role	 that	 the	 international	 community	 plays	 in	 intervention	 stories	 stating:	 ‘the	 international	
community	plays	 the	role	of	 the	masculine,	active	hero,	while	states	 targeted	 for	 intervention	
occupy	the	position	of	the	secondary,	passive	victim’.		
	
The	western	world	and	the	US	in	particular	were	depicted	as	the	saviours	of	the	Kony	story.	At	
the	 end	 of	 the	 video	 we	 see	 the	 US	 sending	 in	 military	 support	 and	 technology	 to	 help	 the	
‘primitive’	Ugandan	army	track	down	Kony	in	the	vast	and	savage	Ugandan	jungle.	These	scenes	
employ	the	saviour	metaphor	by	constructing	Ugandans	as	primitive	and	in	need	of	rescue	by	
the	strong,	experienced	and	morally	superior	US.	Similar	saviour	references	feature	throughout	
the	 documentary	 as	 US	 activists	 declare:	 ‘we	 are	 demanding	 justice’;	 ‘we	 are	 going	 to	 do	
everything	that	we	can	to	stop	them.	We	are	going	to	stop	them’;	 ‘we	[are]	committed	to	stop	
Kony	and	rebuild	what	he	has	destroyed’;	‘if	we	succeed	we	change	the	course	of	human	history’	
(Invisible	 Children	 2012a).	 The	 presentation	 of	 the	 pre‐formulated	 solution	 of	 military	
intervention	 helped	 produce	 a	 sellable,	 easy	 to	 digest	 message	 capable	 of	 achieving	 an	
empathetic	 response	 from	 a	 wide	 audience.	 As	 Jason	 Russell	 stated,	 ‘no	 one	 wants	 a	 boring	
documentary	on	Africa	…	maybe	we	have	to	make	it	pop	and	we	have	to	make	it	cool	…	we	view	
ourself	[sic]	as	the	Pixar	of	human	rights	stories’	(Kron	and	Goodman	2012).	Invisible	Children	
explained	their	solution‐driven	strategy,	stating:		
	
There	are	a	lot	of	good	documentaries	out	there	that	paint	a	well‐told	story	about	
something	that’s	wrong	with	the	world.	But	…	they	rarely	presume	to	propose	an	
answer;	they	just	beautifully	articulate	the	problem.	And	we	hate	that	…	What	we	
did	was	paint	moral	clarity	and	provide	direct	action	steps	(Jefferson	2012).		
	
The	 presentation	 of	 a	 clear	 solution	 to	 the	 identified	 problem	was	 galvanising	 and	 the	 focus	
enabled	many	people	to	connect	with	the	documentary,	giving	it	‘spreadability’	(Gregory	2012).	
	
Along	with	the	US	army,	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	is	also	presented	as	a	saviour	for	
Uganda	 because	 the	 video	 strongly	 supports	 prosecution	 of	 Joseph	 Kony	 by	 the	 ICC.	 The	
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narrator,	 Jason	Russell,	 states:	 ‘in	2002	when	 the	Court	was	 first	started	 their	 job	was	 to	 find	
and	demand	the	arrest	of	the	world’s	worst	criminals’	(Invisible	Children	2012a).	The	nobility	of	
the	ICC	as	a	saviour	is	supported	by	statements	from	the	former	Chief	Prosecutor	of	the	Court,	
Luis	Moreno	Ocampo:	 ‘Kony	 is	 the	 first	 guy	 indicted	 by	 the	 ICC	 ...	we	 needed	 to	 plan	 how	 to	
arrest	 Kony.	 The	 only	way	 to	 stop	Kony	 is	 to	 show	 that	we’re	 going	 to	 arrest	 you’	 (Invisible	
Children	2012a).	The	narratives	of	the	Kony	2012	video	parallel	the	Court’s	ideologies	of	justice,	
fairness	 and	 equality,	 and	 assist	with	 the	 construction	 and	 reinforcement	 of	 the	 ICC	 through	
enduring	representations	of	savages,	victims	and	saviours.5		
	
There	 are	 several	worrisome	 implications	 associated	with	 the	 strategies	 adopted	 by	 Invisible	
Children	and	the	solution	that	 they	proffer.	By	presenting	US	military	action	and	 international	
criminal	 prosecution	 by	 the	 ICC	 as	 the	 best	 (and	 only)	 solution,	 the	 Kony	 2012	 campaign	
reinforced	 the	 narratives	 of	 savages	 and	 saviours	 that	 in	 turn	 shape	 the	 structure	 of	
international	society	and	reproduce	a	geopolitics	where	powerful	western	countries	can	engage	
via	humanitarian	intervention.	This	intervention	is	presented	as	impartial	and	benevolent	as	the	
rule	 of	 law	 is	 invoked	 to	 criminalise	 particular	 actions	 while	 justifying	 intervention,	 thus	
entrenching	 the	 identities	 of	 heroes	 and	 villains	 or	 savages	 and	 saviours	 as	 an	 ordering	
principle	for	international	society.	Human	rights	narratives	are	legitimised	by	international	law	
and	 international	 criminal	 justice	which	 adds	 the	 process	 of	 criminalisation	 of	 the	 savages,	 a	
process	which	reinforces	the	uneven	landscape	of	global	relations.		
	
The	use	of	prosecution	and	rule	of	law	narratives	obfuscate	the	political	and	strategic	nature	of	
intervention	 and	 present	 international	 prosecution	 as	 axiomatic	 and	 unproblematic.	 This	 is	
particularly	troublesome	as	the	rule	of	law	narrative	and	the	legitimising	force	of	international	
criminal	justice	is	increasingly	being	used	alongside	military	intervention.	While	it	may	not	be	a	
new	 phenomenon,	 the	 merging	 of	 both	 military	 action	 and	 international	 law,	 defined	 as	
‘muscular	humanitarianism’,	is	intensifying	and	increasing	and	is	operating	under	the	rubric	of	
the	 responsibility	 to	 protect	 (Orford	 1999,	 2011).	 The	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 bolstered	 these	
narratives	by	urging	US	military	 intervention	in	Uganda	to	catch	Joseph	Kony	and	support	the	
ICC’s	attempt	to	prosecute	Joseph	Kony	in	The	Hague.	Both	the	US	and	the	ICC	were	able	to	use	
these	 narratives	 to	 intervene	 in	 Uganda	 in	 ways	 that	 were	 meaningful	 and	 useful	 to	 their	
strategic	 interests.	For	example,	 the	US	capitalised	on	 the	wave	of	 support	 for	 intervention	 in	
Uganda	to	establish	a	military	presence	in	the	African	region	(Branch	2012).	Following	Invisible	
Children’s	initial	campaign,	the	US	sent	troops	to	Uganda	to	help	the	Ugandan	government	find	
Joseph	Kony.6		
	
At	the	same	time,	the	ICC	is	able	to	connect	with	and	use	the	Kony	2012	campaign	to	further	its	
visibility	and	credibility	as	an	emerging	institution	on	the	international	stage.	Ocampo	claimed	
that	 ‘the	 video	 mobilised	 the	 world	 and	 that	 the	 viral	 strategy	 and	 campaign	 to	 make	
international	criminals	famous	could	assist	in	the	fight	for	international	justice’	(Holligan	2012).	
The	Kony	2012	video	closely	aligned	with	the	ICC’s	narrative	of	ending	impunity,	stopping	and	
preventing	violence,	and	helping	victims	through	 international	prosecutions.	 In	particular,	 the	
focus	of	the	Kony	2012	video	on	the	use	of	child	soldiers	legitimated	the	ICC’s	current	focus	on	
child	 soldiers.	 In	 Uganda,	 widespread	 crimes	 have	 occurred	 and	 have	 been	 committed	 by	 a	
variety	of	actors.	The	parochial	account	given	by	the	Kony	2012	campaign	aligns	with	the	ICC’s	
narrow	investigations	and	prosecutions	in	Uganda.	The	ICC	was	thus	able	to	feature	in	and	use	
the	Kony	2012	video	 to	 legitimise	 its	 actions	 and	validate	 its	model	 of	 selective	prosecutions	
which	are	also	underpinned	by	the	savages,	victims	and	saviour	metaphor.	
	
The	Ugandan	government	is	presented	as	both	a	savage	country	through	depictions	of	Kony	and	
the	 LRA	 and	 a	 victim	 country	 through	 images	 of	 a	 primitive	 army	 and	 impotent	 government	
which	are	unable	to	control	the	crimes	of	the	LRA.	These	subjectivities	do	not	afford	power	to	
the	 Ugandan	 people	 but	 rather	 reinforce	 an	 international	 order	 based	 on	 strong,	 powerful,	
saviour	states,	and	weak,	defective	victim/savage	states.	This	narrative	does	not	acknowledge	
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the	strategic	nature	of	the	Ugandan	government	which	has	itself	used	international	intervention	
to	achieve	its	own	interests.7	Uganda’s	referral	of	the	situation	to	the	ICC	focused	exclusively	on	
crimes	committed	by	the	LRA	(Government	of	Uganda	2003),	meaning	the	government’s	crimes	
remain	 unrecognised	 in	 the	 international	 community.	 In	 this	 way,	 Kony	 2012	 further	
legitimates	 the	 Ugandan	 government	 by	 casting	 them	 as	 victims	 who	 are	 incapable	 of	
controlling	 the	 LRA.	 Simultaneously,	 the	 state	 of	 Uganda	 is	 also	 ‘savage’,	 for	 in	 the	 savage,	
victim,	 saviour	metaphor	of	 the	human	rights	project	 the	 state	 is	 ‘depicted	as	 the	operational	
instrument	of	savagery’	(Mutua	2001:	202).		
	
Slacktivism	and	the	global	saviour	subject		
The	 Kony	 2012	 video	 exemplified	 the	 capacity	 and	 scale	 of	 digital	 technologies	 and	 online	
connectivity	 in	an	age	where	 ‘most	of	the	barriers	to	group	action	have	collapsed	and	without	
those	barriers,	we	are	free	to	explore	new	ways	of	gathering	together	and	getting	things	done’	
(Shirky	 2008:	 22).	 The	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 lowered	 involvement	 thresholds,	 preventing	
participants	 from	 deviating	 too	 far	 from	 everyday	 life	 practices	 or	 investing	 too	 much	 time,	
energy	 or	 resources	 to	 participate.	 This	 form	 of	 ‘low‐threshold	 activism’	 does	 have	 its	
consequences	 such	 as	 sustaining	 the	 digital	 divide,	 loss	 of	 newness,	 weak	 network	 ties,	 and	
limiting	the	effects	of	involvement	(cf	Van	Laer	and	Van	Aelst	2010).		
	
The	 presentation	 of	 a	 simplified	 version	 of	 events	 in	 Uganda,	 along	 with	 pre‐formulated	
solutions,	restricts	opportunity	for	activists	to	engage	in	actual	reform.	Activists’	voices,	in	the	
form	 of	 ‘clicks	 of	 support’,	 are	 instead	 used	 to	 bolster	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 Invisible	 Children	 and	
sustain	the	organisation’s	modus	operandi	of	creating	flashy	awareness‐raising	videos.	Invisible	
Children	 reaped	significant	 funds	 from	the	Kony	2012	Campaign	and	proceeds	have	gone	 into	
funding	 other	 videos	 and	 awareness‐raising	 activities	 (Invisible	 Children	 2012b).	 However,	
focusing	solely	on	awareness	raising	results	in	superficial	engagement	with	problems,	a	limited	
understanding	of	complex	issues,	and	solutions	that	have	minimal	impact.		
	
Many	 commentators	 have	 criticised	 the	 increasing	 ease	 of	 online	 political	 participation	 and	
have	 adopted	 the	 term	 ‘slacktivism’8	 to	 designate	 particular	 forms	 of	 political	 behavior	
characterised	as	‘feel‐good’,	‘easy’	or	‘lazy’	digital	activism	(cf	Morozov	2009a).	Slacktivism	can	
be	 thought	 of	 as	 ‘low‐risk,	 low‐cost	 activity	 via	 social	 media,	 whose	 purpose	 is	 to	 raise	
awareness,	produce	change,	or	grant	satisfaction	to	the	person	engaged	in	the	activity’	(Rotman	
et	 al.	 2011:	 280).	 Along	 with	 this	 ‘feel‐good’	 sensation,	 slacktivism	 provides	 users	 with	 an	
enhanced	sense	of	political	efficacy.	However,	users	are	generally	limited	in	generating	reform	
or	influencing	decision‐makers.	For	Morozov	(2009b),	slacktivism	is	evident	‘where	our	digital	
effort	makes	us	feel	very	useful	and	important	but	have	zero	social	impact’.		
	
Halupka	 (2014:	 115‐116)	 identifies	 clicktivism	 as	 including,	 among	 others,	 ‘online	 petitions,	
content	 sharing,	 [and]	 social	 buttons	 (for	 example,	 Facebook’s	 “Like”	 button)’.	 Through	
participation	in	slacktivism,	it	is	considered	that	the	very	act	itself	signals	‘…	the	end‐rather	than	
the	beginning‐of	our	engagement	with	a	cause	…’	(Morozov	2009b).	Gladwell	(2010)	is	critical	
of	slacktivism	and	digital	activism	more	generally,	highlighting	how	such	activities	rely	on	loose	
ties	 and	 foster	weak	 connections	 as	 opposed	 to	 strong	personal	 connections	 characteristic	 of	
traditional	 face‐to‐face	 interactions.	 This	 often	 leads	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 resolve	 from	 activists	 to	
confront	 entrenched	 norms	 and	 practices	 (Gladwell	 2010).	 By	 encouraging	 participants	 to	
simply	click	a	‘like’	button,	slacktivism	fails	to	inspire	‘with	the	kind	of	emotional	fire	that	forces	
a	shift	in	public	perception’	(McCafferty	2011:	18).	In	due	course,	it	is	thought	slacktivism	may	
replace	traditional	forms	of	political	participation	(cf	Christensen	2011).	In	a	similar	vein,	White	
(2010)	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	widespread	 yet	 shallow	 engagement	with	 issues	
driven	by	the	logic	of	consumerism.	Under	the	logic	of	clicktivism,	social	change	is	marketed	as	a	
brand	 by	 using	 strategies	 of	 advertising	 and	market	 research	which	 in	 turn	 has	 the	 effect	 of	
passive	social	engagement	(cf	White	2010).	As	a	result,	slacktivism	can	be	‘…	seen	as	potentially	
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damaging	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 civic	 and	 political	 life	 as	 they	 distract	 citizens	 from	making	more	
meaningful	and	important	contributions’	(Skoric	2012:	77).		
	
Brough	(2012)	describes	Kony	2012	as	exemplifying	commodity	activism,	because	 it	 involves	
the	 branding	 and	 consumption	 of	 humanitarian	 projects.	 Invisible	 Children	 succeeded	 in	
motivating	 individuals	 to	participate	 in	 the	movement	because	 little	 time,	effort	 and	 resource	
were	demanded.	Through	association	with	the	humanitarian	savior	identity	and	the	Kony	2012	
brand,	individuals	understood	themselves	to	traverse	borders	and	solve	global	problems	across	
expanded	and	deterritorialised	 connections.	 Yet	 it	 is	 predominately	western	 global	 elites	 and	
those	 with	 the	 capacity	 to	 engage	 with	 digital	 technologies	 which	 hold	 the	 privilege	 of	 the	
morally	 superior,	 global	 saviour.	 The	 ‘feel	 good’	 factor	 associated	with	 online	participation	 is	
increased	 in	 the	 ‘age	of	 great	 exhibitionism’	 (Keen	2012)	where	 identity	 is	 formed	 via	 online	
platforms.	 Participation	 in	 Kony	 2012	 meant	 being	 part	 of	 a	 worldwide	 phenomenon,	 an	
appealing	 prospect	 for	 affirming	 the	 subjectivities	 of	 actors	 as	 heroes,	 who	 are	 locally	 and	
globally	engaged.	
	
The	heroic	or	 ‘feel	good’	 factor	associated	with	slacktivism	 is	a	major	part	of	 the	attraction	of	
digital	activism.	Christensen	(2011)	points	out	that	digital	activism	is	more	effective	in	making	
participants	 feel	 good	about	 themselves	 than	 in	achieving	political	goals.	 In	 this	 sense,	digital	
action	serves	to	increase	awareness	of	situations	but	achieves	limited	practical	outcomes	aside	
from	 confirming	 the	 heroic	 identity	 of	 those	who	participate.	 The	Kony	 video	 reinforced	 this	
subjectivity	by	depicting	young	activists	as	heroes	to	mobilise	their	support.	For	example,	in	the	
video,	Jason	Russell	declares:	‘who	are	you	to	end	a	war?	I	am	here	to	tell	you	–	who	are	you	not	
to?’	 (Invisible	 Children	 2012a).	 Further,	 inspirational	 cries	 for	 action	 galvanised	 support,	 as	
Jason	 Russell	 declared:	 ‘we	 are	 not	 just	 studying	 human	 history,	 we	 are	 shaping	 it’	 and	 ‘the	
better	 world	 we	 want	 is	 coming,	 it’s	 just	 waiting	 for	 us	 to	 stop	 at	 nothing’.	 These	 types	 of	
messages	 ensure	 that	 the	 emotional	 and	 affective	 sentiment	 is	 captured	 and	 internalised	 by	
participants	 (Conradson	 and	McKay	 2007).	 As	 this	 illustrates,	 the	 construction	 of	 activists	 as	
heroes	 relies	 on	 the	 savages,	 victims	 and	 saviours	 metaphor,	 as	 the	 passive	 victim	 in	 the	
narrative	reaffirms	the	importance	of	those	who	identify	as	a	heroic	figure	(Orford	1999).	These	
narratives	augment	biographies	of	caring	and	help	relieve	 the	 ‘white	girl’s	burden’,	or	equally	
the	 ‘white	 man’s	 burden’	 (Izama	 2012a),	 of	 affluent	 consumer	 activists	 residing	 in	 the	
developed	world	(Finnegan	2013).	
	
There	are	others,	however,	who	are	unconvinced	by	the	dismissive	arguments	charged	against	
clicktivism.	 Halupka	 (2014:	 116)	 suggests	 that	 current	 research	 ‘continues	 to	 describe	
clicktivism	 in	broad	 terms,	 failing	 to	 effectively	 establish	what	 it	does,	 and	does	not,	 involve’.	
From	this	position,	primary	appraisals	of	the	term	have	circumscribed	clicktivism	to	a	‘mode	of	
online	engagement’,	while	neglecting	 the	 ‘specific	 form	of	online	action’.	Halupka	 (2014:	124‐
125)	offers	a	method	to	better	recognise	the	Cause	and	Object	of	digital	activism.9	The	result	is	
an	 improved	comprehension	of	 clicktivism	 ‘as	 a	political	 action,	 separate	 from	 the	 campaigns	
that	it	supports’.		
	
In	a	US	context,	Lee	and	Hsieh	(2013)	 investigate	 the	effects	of	slacktivism	(signing	an	online	
petition)	on	activism	(civic	participation).	The	outcomes	of	their	study	indicate	that	when	civic	
participation	 (that	 is,	 donating	 to	 a	 charity)	 is	 consistent	 with	 slacktivism	 (that	 is,	 petition	
signing)	 participants	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 reliable	 and	 donate	 to	 charity,	 demonstrating	 a	
consistency	 effect	 (Lee	 and	 Hsieh	 2013).	 Alternatively,	 when	 slacktivism	 was	 not	 observed,	
participants	 in	 fact	 donated	 more	 to	 an	 unrelated	 charity,	 demonstrating	 a	 moral	 balancing	
effect	 (Lee	 and	 Hsieh	 2013).	 What	 Lee	 and	 Hsieh	 (2013:	 9)	 highlight	 is	 that	 ‘slacktivism	 in	
general	 may	 help	 subsequent	 activism,	 regardless	 of	 how	 many	 people	 actually	 choose	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 slacktivism’.	 Similarly,	 a	 recent	 study	 by	 Christensen	 (2012)	 found	 that	
slacktivism	does	not	contribute	to	findings	of	political	and	civic	detachment,	inactivity,	or	lack	of	
political	competence	as	a	result	of	online	activism.		
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Reflecting	 on	 the	 slacktivism	 nature	 of	 Kony	 2012,	 we	 witness	 that	 the	 Invisible	 Children’s	
Campaign	 provided	 more	 than	 a	 simplified	 and	 passive	 engagement	 with	 a	 particular	
phenomenon.	 With	 international	 debate	 and	 criticism	 directed	 towards	 Invisible	 Children’s	
seemingly	 parochial	 promotion	 of	 Kony	 2012,	 it	 in	 fact	 expanded	 discussions	 beyond	 Joseph	
Kony	and	the	LRA.	The	amount	of	attention	given	to	the	video	enveloped	the	Ugandan	and	US	
governments	as	well	as	the	African	Union	(AU)	into	the	fray,	all	of	which	supported	the	effort,	
leaving	open	the	possibility	for	criticism	(Su	and	Besliu	2012).10	This	in	turn	expanded	space	for	
interrogation	of	 the	 actors	 and	 institutions	 involved.	Beyond	 Invisible	Children’s	 promotion	of	
Kony	2012,	the	campaign	itself	also	engendered	a	type	of	personalised,	user‐generated	analysis	
of	 the	matter.	The	 result	was	 an	evaluation	of	 the	historical	 context	of	 the	LRA	 in	Uganda	by	
inspired	participants	who	conducted	 their	own	 investigation.	Further,	by	questioning	suitable	
forms	 of	 intervention	 in	Uganda,	 this	 personalised	 inquiry	 also	 examined	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ICC.	
Most	 importantly,	 it	 also	 enabled	 participants	 to	 directly	 engage	 with	 Ugandan	 and	 African	
perspectives	(cf	Brown	et	al.	2012).	What	this	establishes,	in	the	context	of	Kony	2012,	is	that,	
far	 from	 the	harms	associated	with	 ‘low‐cost’,	 ‘low‐risk’,	 ‘lazy’	 and	 ‘feel	good’	digital	 activism,	
slacktivism	 processes	 actually	 expanded	 awareness,	 stimulated	 debate	 across	 temporal	 and	
spatial	 boundaries,	 and	 developed	 nuances	 of	 deeper	 issues	 present	 in	 Uganda	 and	 the	
international	community.		
	
Despite	 these	 mobilising	 discourses,	 the	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 essentially	 endeavored	 to	
engineer	 subjects	 to	 uncritically	 consume	 narratives	 and	 solutions	 that	 reinforced	 their	
subjectivity	as	a	global	hero‐activist.	This	lack	of	in‐depth	and	balanced	knowledge	delivered	by	
Kony	2012,	 coupled	with	 its	 simple	and	appealing	solution,	 led	 for	 the	most	part	 to	uncritical	
examination	of	a	situation	in	Uganda	while	appealing	to	the	status	quo.	Kony	2012	reinforced	
the	problematic	 subjectivities	 and	 structures	 that	 shape	muscular	humanitarianism,	based	on	
selective	 judicial	 and	 military	 intervention,	 and	 served	 to	 reproduce	 it.	 Activists	 were	 not	
encouraged	 to	 use	 their	 agency	 in	 a	 reflexive	 manner	 while	 reform	 was	 dependent	 on	 the	
consumption	 of	 the	 brand,	 rather	 than	 the	 desire	 to	 understand	 the	 problem.	 As	 a	 result,	
activists	were	 productive	 in	maintaining	 hegemonic	 narratives	 and	 structures	 of	 domination.	
Gladwell	 (2010)	 summarises	 the	 concern:	 ‘The	 instruments	of	 social	media	are	well	 suited	 to	
making	the	existing	social	order	more	efficient.	They	are	not	a	natural	enemy	of	the	status	quo’.	
	
It	is	clear	to	see	how	the	charges	of	slacktivism	can	be	levied	against	the	Kony	2012	Campaign.	
Invisible	 Children	 sought	 to	 garner	 widespread	 online	 support	 which	 was	 quantified	 by	 the	
number	of	YouTube	views,	Facebook	‘likes’	and	(re)Tweets	achieved.	Invisible	Children	explicitly	
sought	 to	 empower	 young	 people	 to	 use	 the	 digital	 medium	 to	 participate	 and	 support	 by	
sharing	 and	 liking	 their	 video.	To	encourage	 this	 type	 of	 participation	 they	used	 the	 logics	of	
digital	culture	and	connective	action,	emphasising	the	transformative	potential	of	social	media.	
The	central	refrain	was	that	‘humanity’s	greatest	desire	is	to	belong	and	connect’,	and	that	‘right	
now,	 there	 are	 more	 people	 on	 Facebook	 than	 were	 on	 the	 planet	 200	 years	 ago’	 (Invisible	
Children	2012a).	As	Kron	and	Goodman	(2012)	highlight,	the	video	‘clearly	tapped	into	a	vein	of	
youthful	 idealism	 that	 the	 authorities	 the	world	 over	 have	 been	 struggling	 –	 and	 failing	 –	 to	
comprehend	and	keep	up	with’.		
	
Moving	beyond	the	advantages	of	digital	activism	and,	in	turn,	slacktivism,	on	political	and	civic	
engagement,	 Skoric	 (2012:	 86)	 rightfully	 warns	 that	 the	 peril	 of	 slacktivism	 lies	 in	 its	 ‘…	
misperception	that	these	digital	activities	[slacktivism]	directly	lead	to	actual	political	or	social	
changes,	and	thus	may	lull	citizens	into	an	illusion	that	such	activities	are	not	only	effective,	but	
also	preferable	to	the	methods	of	traditional	activism’.	What	we	suggest,	then,	is	that	the	Kony	
2012	 Campaign	 juxtaposed	 humanitarian	 interventionism	 along	 status	 quo	 narratives	 thus	
reproducing	 normative	 structures	 of	 domination.	 However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 also	 raised	
awareness	of	the	atrocities	committed	by	the	LRA	and	galvanised	some	critical	discussion	of	the	
international	 response	by	 the	 ICC,	US,	Uganda	 and	AU.	Without	 the	 reach	 and	 engagement	of	
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Kony	2012,	the	latter	would	otherwise	be	unfamiliar.	Nevertheless,	the	question	of	whether	it	is	
justified	 with	 the	 pleasures	 of	 the	 former	 remains.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 our	 argument,	
participants	are	not	observed	as	simplified	and	indolent	consumers	of	the	Kony	2012	brand	per	
se	but	regrettably	limited	in	their	repertoires	of	action	for	change	through	the	medium	in	which	
it	is	presented.	
	
Conclusion		
Kony	2012	illustrated	the	 ‘dark	side’	of	the	commodification	of	humanitarian	action	(Kennedy	
2004)	 and	 the	 danger	 of	 promoting	 oversimplified	 ‘Pixar’	 like	 productions.	 The	 distorted	
messages	 and	 pre‐fabricated	 solution	 to	 the	 complex	 situation	 in	 Uganda	 resulted	 in	 a	
reinforcement	 of	 passive	 activist	 subjectivities.	 The	 documentary	 was	 a	 one‐dimensional,	
esoteric	 representation	 of	 a	 complex	 and	 long‐standing	 conflict	 in	 Uganda	 where	 emotive	
visualisations	hailed	empathetic	 responses.	 Invisible	Children’s	 use	of	 the	 savages,	 victims	and	
saviours	metaphor	was	driven	by	a	desire	 for	 impact	and	spreadability	 in	a	digital	age	where	
easily‐digestible	narratives	render	complex	situations	and	messages	more	understandable	and	
engaging.	 Oversimplification	 arose	 from	 the	 heavy	 reliance	 on	 existing	 narratives	 and	
hegemonic	 templates	 of	 violence	 and	 human	 rights,	 and	 it	 was	 these	 narratives	 told	 so	
effectively	 that	captured	so	many	activists	 in	 the	digital	space.	This	meant	 the	video	achieved	
widespread	attention	yet	lacked	meaningful	insight	into	the	real	actors	and	causes	of	injustice	in	
Uganda	 (Izama	 2012b),	 and	 consequently	 provided	 limited	 critical	 insight	 into	 options	 for	
effective	 change	 (Gregory	 2012).	 The	 Kony	 2012	 Campaign	 reinforced	 existing	 subjectivities	
based	 on	 cultural	 templates	 of	 savages,	 victims	 and	 saviours	 and	maintained	western‐liberal	
narratives	by	coupling	militarism	and	institutional	criminal	justice	as	responses	to	Joseph	Kony,	
while	 encouraging	 activists	 to	 passively	 adopt	 the	 role	 of	 hero.	 In	 doing	 this,	 the	 video	
legitimated	 and	 cemented	 the	 increasing	 reliance	 on	 muscular	 humanitarianism	 and	 the	
blurring	of	military	and	judicial	intervention	as	the	dominant	structure	for	international	society.		
	
As	the	struggles	in	Uganda	illustrate,	while	intervention	narratives	play	out	on	the	international	
stage,	 local	 governments	 and	 actors	 are	 able	 to	 selectively	 engage	 with	 these	 narratives	 to	
achieve	 their	 strategic	 interests	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 The	 desire	 of	 Invisible	 Children	 to	 present	
moral	clarity	through	the	rendering	of	such	a	complex	and	long‐standing	conflict	into	a	simple	
story	 of	 good	 and	 evil	 provided	 an	 appealing	 basis	 for	mass	 engagement	with	 the	 issue.	 Yet	
Invisible	 Children’s	 presentation	 of	 a	 pre‐formulated	 solution	 provided	 little	 room	 for	
individuals	to	question	the	forces	that	maintain	the	framework	of	international	society,	let	alone	
the	problematic	pattern	of	international	intervention.	The	Kony	2012	Campaign	did	not	stop	the	
physical	violence	of	the	LRA;	at	the	time	of	writing,	Joseph	Kony	remains	at	large	and	the	LRA	
continues	to	perpetrate	violence	in	Uganda	and	neighbouring	countries	(United	Nations	2013).	
The	campaign	also	perpetuated	the	symbolic	violence	of	western	hegemony	by	reinforcing	the	
metaphor	of	savages	and	saviours	that	underpins	the	uneven	international	order.	
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1	The	authors	thank	Professor	Willem	de	Lint,	Dr	Maria	Giannacopoulos,	Associate	Professor	Derek	Dalton,	the	two	
anonymous	reviewers,	and	the	editors	of	this	special	edition	for	their	useful	feedback	and	constructive	comments	
on	this	article.	
2	Facebook’s	‘like’	and	‘share’	options	are	defined	as	social	buttons	which	enable	users	to	communicate	and	express	
their	opinions,	while	at	the	same	time	forwarding	information	to	other	users	(cf	Halupka	2014).		
3	The	‘Cover	the	Night’	event	fizzled	out	(Garber	2012)	and	went	relatively	unnoticed,	eclipsed	by	the	massive	online	
success	of	the	Kony	2012	video.		
4	Violence,	political	turmoil,	war,	and	conflict	have	plagued	Uganda	since	its	independence	in	1962	(Allen	2006).	This	
violence	has	 been	 caused	by	 constant	 political	 coups	 and	 insurgencies	 from	 rebel	 groups	 struggling	 for	 political	
power	over	the	past	two	decades	(Mullins	and	Rothe	2008a:	129).		
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5	 These	 narratives	 are	 also	 reflected	 in	 other	 documentaries	 that	 highlight	 human	 rights	 abuses	 and	 call	 for	
international	 criminal	 justice	 responses.	 For	 example,	 the	 documentary	 The	 Reckoning:	 The	 Battle	 for	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	(2009)	presents	the	ICC	as	the	saviour	of	countries	such	as	the	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo	(DRC)	who	are	represented	as	primitive	and	uncivilised.	The	 film	depicts	 the	violence	 in	the	DRC	through	
scenes	 that	 shows	 groups	 of	marauding	 rebels,	 led	 by	 rebel‐leader	 Thomas	 Lubunga,	 yelling	 and	waving	 crude	
weapons	 while	 pillaging	 helpless	 communities	 (Handmaker	 2011).	 As	 Handmaker	 (2011:	 104)	 highlights,	 the	
implications	of	the	film	is	clear	‘without	the	ICC,	the	Congo	would	descend	ever	further	into	barbarism	and	despair’.	
6	 Some	 commentators	 have	 cited	 recent	 discoveries	 of	 large	 oil	 deposits	 in	 Uganda	 as	 the	 real	 reason	 the	 U.S.	
established	a	military	presence	in	Uganda	(Branch	2012;	Curtis	and	McCarthy	2012).	
7	 For	 example,	Museveni	 and	 the	 Ugandan	 government	 engaged	with	 the	 ICC	 in	 a	 bid	 to	 neutralise	 their	 political	
opponents,	 the	LRA,	while	 increasing	 their	 international	profile	 as	allies	of	 the	west	 (Branch	2007;	Nouwen	and	
Werner	2011).	
8	 This	 article	 considers	 the	 term	 clicktivism	 as	 a	 component	 part	 of	 the	 larger	 slacktivism	 conceptualisation.	 The	
terms	are	used	interchangeably.		
9	According	to	Halupka	(2014:	120‐121),	the	Cause	‘denotes	those	factors	that	influence	a	decision	to	act’,	while	the	
Object	 ‘refers	 to	 content	 created	 in	 an	 online	 environment’.	 For	 example,	 a	 user	will	 post	 a	 link	 of	 a	 newspaper	
article	 to	 a	 Facebook	 group	 (Cause)	 while	 another’s	 interaction	 with	 it	 (‘re‐sharing’)	 becomes	 the	 Object.	 It	 is	
important	 to	 note	 that	 such	 action	 (Cause/Object)	 is	 politically	 motivated	 and	 found	 within	 the	 ‘scene’	 of	 the	
context.		
10	 The	 U.S	 backed	 military	 initiative	 drew	 heavy	 criticised	 from	 commenters,	 while	 Uganda	 is	 seen	 promoting	
economic	development	and	tourism	during	a	time	of	crisis	(Su	and	Besliu	2012).		
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